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UNITED STATES V SHELL OIL: WHEN CONTROL IS NOT
CONTROLLING - THE QUESTION OF FEDERAL ARRANGER
LIABLITY UNDER CERCLA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout our Nation's history, the federal government has
relied upon the endeavors of private manufacturers to supply the
military with the materials required for national defense.' Even
before 1776, American military provisions were the result of cooperative efforts between the government and independent contractors. 2 While today it seems logical, and in some cases imperative, to

consider the environmental effects of these contracts, it was not until the 1970s that attention was focused on this issue. 3 Where modern defense contracts specifically stipulate that environmental
cleanup costs will be passed to the taxpayer and procurement policies require consideration of environmental impacts, the contracts
of old typically failed to contemplate the problem. 4
In 1980, Congress addressed the shortcomings of these contracts and passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).5 Under CERCLA, par1. See ERNA RISCH, SUPPLYING WASHINGTON'S ARMY Ch. 1 (1981), available at
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/RevWar/risch/chpt-l.htm (last visited Mar.
30, 2003) (explaining process of supplying Continental Army during American
Revolution). See generally Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (Feb. 13,
1781) available at Rediscovering George Washington, http://www.pbs.org/georgewashington/collection/war_1781febl3.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) (responding to General Washington's request for military provisions).
2. See generally Richard Schack, The Revolutionay Spirit, THE QUEENS TRIBUNE,
available at http://www.queenstribune.com/archives/anniversaryarchive/anniversary2000/revolution.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2003) (describing wealth accumulation by residents of Queens, New York as result of revolutionary war supply
contracts).
3. See Major Kenneth Michael Theurer, Sharing the Burden: Allocatingthe Risk of
CERCLA Cleanup Costs, 50 A.F. L. Rv. 65, 65 (2001) (explaining that government
contracts seldom included provisions for environmental remediation before legislators passed environmental statutes during 1970s).
4. See id. (stating that today's defense contracts include cost of environmental
cleanup in contract price).
5. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994) [hereinafter CERCLA] (providing legislative process for hazardous waste cleanup and recovery of cleanup expenses); see also Lieutenant Colonel Cheryl Lynch Nilsson, Defense ContractorRecovery of Cleanup Costs at
Contractor Owned and Operated Facilitites,38 A.F. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994) (describing
CERCLA as "most comprehensive federal statute" to deal with prior hazardous
waste contamination).
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ties may be held responsible for the cleanup costs of environmental
pollution, even if the damage occurred prior to the adoption of
CERCLA. 6 CERCLA provides liability for private parties, as well as
for the United States, should they fall into one of four limited
7
classifications.
Recently, in United States v. Shell Oil,8 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the application of CERCLA to cleanup costs resulting from a World War II era defense contract. 9 Although the
Ninth Circuit refused to find the United States liable, the court affirmed past precedent that the United States intended, at least to a
limited degree, to waive sovereign immunity under CERCLA.' 0
The court provided further guidance on how to interpret this limited waiver and in what circumstances it could apply.1 1

6. See United States v. Shell Oil, 841 F. Supp. 962, 974 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that CERCLA language, legislative history and judicial interpretation all support retroactive application; retroactive application of CERCLA does not offend
constitutional due process)'. See also United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 898
(E.D. N.C. 1985) (explaining "[t]hat Congress intended CERCLA to apply to acts
committed before enactment of the statute is clear from the wording of the statute
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982), has been consistently agreed upon by courts which
have addressed the issue.").
7. See Nilsson, supra note 5, at 3 (describing congressional intent for CERCLA
to apply to private parties and United States similarly).
8. 294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 850 (Jan. 13, 2003)
[hereinafter Shell Oil].
9. For a discussion of Shell Oil facts, see infta notes 16-33 and accompanying
text.
10. For a discussion of federal sovereign immunity waiver under CERCLA, see
infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text; see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (stating in dicta that CERCLA contained waiver of federal
immunity); FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 840 (3rd
Cir. 1994) (interpreting that CERCLA § 120(a) (1) holds United States "liable in
the same manner and to the same extent as any non-governmental entity."); East
Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 142 F.3d 479, 481 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (holding "that the waiver of immunity contained in § 9620(a)(1) is coextensive with the scope of the substantive liability standards of CERCLA."). See
generally United Statesv. Skipper, 781 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (E.D. N.C. 1991) (stating
"[t]here is no question that Congress expected government agencies to shoulder
their proportionate share of CERCLA response costs when they have acted as owners, operators, generators or transporters."); In Re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 790
F. Supp. 94, 96 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (finding waiver of sovereign immunity under CERCLA section 120(a) to be "limited only to circumstances under which a private
party could also be held liable.").
11. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1053 (stating that "CERCLA's waiver of sovereign
immunity is coextensive with the scope of liability imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 9607.").
Under CERCLA § 107 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 9607), liability falls upon the following: those who own or operate a facility; those who owned or operated a facility at
the time a hazardous substance was disposed; those who arrange for disposal or
treatment or transportation for purposes of disposal or treatment; those who accept a hazardous substance for transport. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1-4).
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This Note examines the federal waiver of sovereign immunity
pursuant to CERCLA as well as the circumstances in which the government may be held liable, focusing specifically on federal liability
as an "arranger." Part II discusses the facts of Shell Oil and Part III
reviews the background leading up to the Shell Oil decision. 12 Part
IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit's rationale in failing to assign liability
to the United States.' 3 Part V provides a critical evaluation of the
court's rationale relative to Congressional intent and the prior
holdings of other circuits. 14 Finally, Part VI suggests the likely im5
pact of Shell Oil on future CERCLA litigation.'
II.

FACTS

In 1942, Shell Oil Company, Union Oil Company, Atlantic
Richfield Company and Texaco, Inc. (Oil Companies), all of which
operated refineries near Los Angeles, contracted with Eli McColl to
transport acid waste from their refineries and dump it on land in
Fullerton, California, now known as the McColl Superfund Site
(McColl Site).16 The waste at issue resulted from the production of
aviation fuel pursuant to World War II contracts between the Oil
Companies and the United States military. 17 These contracts, silent
as to who would bear the burden of waste treatment, required the
Oil Companies to drastically increase the quantity of aviation fuel
production to meet wartime demand levels.' 8
12. For a discussion of Shell Oil facts, see infra notes 16-33 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the occurrences leading up to the Shell Oil decision, see
infra notes 34-91 and accompanying text.
13. For a narrative analysis of the Shell Oil decision, see infra notes 92-111 and
accompanying text.
14. For a critical analysis of the Shell Oil decision, see infra notes 112-49 and
accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the likely impact of the Shell Oil decision, see infra
notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
16. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1051 (describing history of McColl disposal contracts). In addition to the alkylation acid and acid sludge waste generated from
avgas production, McColl also accepted acid sludge from benzol production. See
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1023 (C.D. Cal. 1998) [hereinafter Shell III]. This waste was a byproduct of a contract, separate from the avgas
contracts, in which Shell Oil manufactured benzol for the Government. See id.
The Government did not originally dispute its liability for the cleanup of the benzol waste, which constituted between five and six percent of the waste at the McCoil Site. See id.
17. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1048 (explaining that Oil Companies in Los Angeles area dumped waste from aviation fuel production at McColl site). For a discussion of World War II aviation fuel production, see infra notes 34-47 and
accompanying text.
18. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1050 (describing how government agencies relied
almost exclusively on contractual agreements to ensure avgas production).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

3

280

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4
VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIV: p.

277

As a result of the amplified production, hazardous waste levels

increased.' 9 Starting in June 1942 and continuing until September
1946, 100,000 cubic yards of waste was dumped in unlined sumps at
the McColl Site. 2 11The government was aware that the manufacture
of aviation fuel produced hazardous waste and attempted to alleviate the problem of waste accumulation at the refineries by assisting
with the lease of a storage facility in Southern California. 21 The
government, however, never overtly mandated or approved the
dumping of waste and was never proven to be aware of the dumping at the McColl site. 22 During the 1950s, McColl and the Oil
Companies filled and sealed these sumps to allow for residential
development of the surrounding area.2 3 The government incurred
nearly one hundred million dollars in costs when the waste was fi24
nally removed during the 1990s.

The United States, along with the State of California, brought
suit against the Oil Companies under CERCLA to recover the cost
of cleaning up the McColl site. 2 5 The Oil Companies counterclaimed, arguing that under CERCLA the United States was liable. 26 In a series of written opinions, the District Court of the
19. See id. (stating that "[d]uring the war, acid sludge was generated in much
greater quantities than ever before ...
.").
20. See id. at 1051 (describing duration of dumping). A sump is "a pit or tank
that catches liquid runoff for drainage or disposal," similar to a cesstank. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Terms of the Environment, at http://www.epa.
gov/ocepaterms/sterms.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2003); see also Santa Barbara
County Air Pollution Control District, Policies and Procedures, at http://www.sbcapcd.org/eng/dl/eng-p&p/6100-060.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) (defining
sump as "excavated depression in the ground that is in more or less continuous use
for separating oil, water, and sand in oil and gas production operations.").
21. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1051 (recounting government involvement in disposal of avgas waste).
22. See id. (explaining role of United States in waste disposal).
23. See id. (describing subsequent history of McColl site). Portions of the McCoil site were developed into the Los Coyotes Country Club and Golf Course. See
Shell , 841 F. Supp. 962, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (providing subsequent history).
Residences were also constructed nearby. See id. During the decade between the
construction of the course and the waste cleanup, reports were made of "black,
viscous, tar-like" acid sludge seeping up to the surface. See id.
24. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1051 (stating amount of damages).
25. See Shell I, 841 F. Supp. at 965 (giving procedural history). The government also sought recovery of costs from McAuley LCX Corporation which was the
subsequent owner of the McColl site. See id. at 966. Recovery of response costs are
allowed pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
26. See Shell 1, 841 F. Supp. at 975 (describing Oil Company claim for contribution from United States). Defendants are permitted to bring actions for contribution pursuant to CERCLA § 113(0. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). In this case,
defendants asserted that the U.S. was liable "due to the alleged control the United
States exercised over the petroleum industry during World War II." Shell I, 841 F.
Supp. at 975.
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Central District of California held that the United States had waived
sovereign immunity to suit under 42 U.S.C. section 9620(a)(1). 2 7
The court also dismissed the Oil Companies' arguments that they
should be exempt from liability under either the "act of war" provision of CERCLA section 107(b) (2) or the "act of third party" defense in CERCLA section 107(b) (3).28 The district court rejected
the Oil Companies' argument that retroactive application of CERCLA was unconstitutional. 29 The court further found both the
United States and the Oil Companies liable as "arrangers" for the
nonbenzol waste cleanup.30 The court, however, allocated 100 percent of the cleanup costs for the waste, to the United States. -' Both
the United States and the Oil Companies appealed the district

27. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19778, at *17-18
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1995) [hereinafter Shell H] (holding that "Congress expressly
and unequivocally waived the immunity of the United States when it enacted
CERCLA.").
28. See Shell 1, 841 F. Supp. at 970-72 (declining to accept refiners' act of war
argument as legitimate defense). Under CERCLA § 107(b) (2), defendants will be
exempted from liability if they "can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the release was 'caused solely by ... an act of war.'" Id. at 970 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2)). Although the district court was unable to come to a definitive conclusion as to how "act of war" should be interpreted, the court determined
that the phrase "cannot reasonably be construed to cover either the government's
wartime contracts to purchase aviation fuel from the oil companies or its regulation of the oil companies' production of aviation fuel." Id. at 972. Pursuant to
CERCLA § 107(b) (3), defendants will not be held liable where a totally unrelated
third party is the sole cause of the release. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (3). The court
held that section 107(b) (3) of CERCLA does not apply to situations in which the
defendant was in a contractual relationship with the third party and that this defense must necessarily fail because of the relationship between the Oil Companies
and the government. See Shell I, 841 F. Supp. at 972-73 (overruling defendant act
of third party argument).
29. See Shell I, 841 F. Supp. at 974 (explaining that CERCLA language, legislative history and prior judicial interpretation all support finding that statute is to be
applied retroactively). The Oil Companies made an additional constitutional
claim, arguing that CERCLA section 107(a) liability was the equivalent of an unconstitutional taking. See id. The court dismissed this claim by showing that CERCLA's provision for contribution negated any possible interpretation of section
107 as a taking. See id.
30. See id. at 1026-29 (finding that both Oil Companies and United States
government qualified as arrangers).
31. See Shell 111, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1026-29 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (assigning total
cost of waste cleanup to United States). Applying factors of equity, the district
court came up with three reasons for allocating the total cost to the United States:
(1) such a result simply places a cost of the war on the United States and
thus on society as a whole, (2) the Oil Companies were unable to transport avgas waste to Richmond for recycling due to the unavailability of
tank cars, and (3) the Oil Companies were unable to construct treatment
plants due to the WPB's refusal to issue priorities.
Id. at 1027.
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court ruling.3 2 On review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals up-

held the finding of arranger liability in respect to the Oil Companies, but reversed the finding of arranger liability against the
33
government.
III.

BACKGROUND

A. World War II Avgas Production
During World War II, the United States military required vast
quantities of a high-octane gasoline used for aviation. 4 Known as
"avgas," this newly developed fuel was formulated through a combination of standard gasoline and various chemical additives.3 5 Alkylate was a primary additive. 36 Referred to as "alkylation," the
production of alkylate requires the use of highly pure forms of sulfuric acid; through the alkylation process, sulfuric acid becomes degraded. 3 7 This tainted "alkylation acid" could either be recycled
and used again for alkylation, used in other production processes
that did not require such a pure form, or disposed of without
38
reuse.
As World War II progressed, the government recognized the
importance of avgas to the war effort and took steps to increase
32. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating appellate arguments). The United States argued that the district court was mistaken in holding
that section 120(a) (1) of CERCLA waives sovereign immunity, that the United
States was liable as an "arranger," and that 100% of the cleanup costs should be
allocated to the United States. See id. The Oil Companies argued that the district
court erred in dismissing their request for immunity under the "act of war" provision of § 9607(b) (2). See id. at 1061-62.
33. See id. (upholding district court rulings that CERCLA waives sovereign immunity and that act of war defense was not appropriate; reversing district court
rulings that United States was liable as arranger).
34. See Shell II, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19778, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1995)
(describing use of avgas). High octane gasoline was of particular importance to
the war effort, for it "allowed allied fighters to attain higher speeds, higher ceil-

ings, faster rates of climb and the ability to carry a heavier load than our enemies
could achieve." Id.
35. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1049 (describing makeup of avgas).
36. See id. (describing avgas composition). Alkylate is a liquid product with a
high octane number which is used to improve the antiknock properties of gasoline. See Encyclopedia of Petroleum Products, available at http://www.prod.exxon.
com/exxonproductdata/lube-encyclopedia/alkylation.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2003).
37. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1049 (explaining use of sulfuric acid in avgas
production). "Approximately 90% of the sulfuric acid used by the refineries during [World War II] was devoted to [alkylation]." Id. Alkylation "continues to withstand the test of time" and is still used today. See Phillips Petroleum Company,
Fuels Technology - Alkylation, at http://www.fuelstechnology.com/alky.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
38. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1049 (describing uses of spent alkylation acid).
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control over its production. 39 The government established the War
Production Board (WPB) and the Petroleum Administration for
War (PAW) to monitor and ensure the manufacture of avgas. 40 Although these agencies had the power to usurp avgas production,
they instead chose long-term contractual agreements with the petroleum refiners. 4 1 The federal government offered these refiners
low interest loans to cover the costs of new avgas production facili42
ties as well as any other unexpected expenses that might result.

While the refiners privately owned these facilities, the government
43
exercised considerable oversight into the production process.
Under the Planned Blending Program, the government mandated
39. See id. (describing government's need for high octane fuel). "During
[World War II], production of avgas increased more than twelve-fold, from
roughly 40,000 barrels per day in December 1941 to 514,000 barrels per day in
1945." Id.
40. See id. at 1049-50 (describing government role in petroleum administration). The War Production Board [hereinafter WPB], created in January 1942
pursuant to a President Roosevelt executive order, was "empowered to issue directives to industry in connection with war procurement and production, including
directives with respect to purchasing, contracting, specification, construction, requisitioning, plant expansion, conversion and financing." Shell Ill, 13 F. Supp. 2d
1018, 1021 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (providing historical background of World War II
military procurement). The WPB was authorized to allocate materials and facilities which it deemed to be in short supply and had the ability to. require private
companies to produce goods needed for the war effort "where it was within the
company's physical and technical capacity to do so." Id. Rooselvelt also created
the Petroleum Administration for War [hereinafter PAW] in 1942 which was
charged with overseeing the petroleum industry. See id. at 1022. One of the specific responsibilities of the PAW was instituting "a petroleum blending program
under which it dictated the quantity and quality of avgas and required quarterly
inventory reports from all refineries, authorized purchase of certain quantities of
raw materials, and instructed refineries with respect to manufacturing specifications." Id.
41. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1049-50 (explaining government seizure power
during war). Individuals who obstructed federal regulation of avgas production or
government procurement of avgas were subject to criminal prosecution. See Shell
III, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
42. See Shell Oi4 294 F.3d at 1049-50 (describing federal aid to assist in construction of avgas production facilities). In addition to low-cost loans, the United
States provided financial assistance to refiners through the Defense Supplies Corporation [hereinafter DSC] and the Aviation Gas Reimbursement Plan [hereinafter AGRP]. See Shell III, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1022-23. Through the DSC, the
government entered into long-term avgas contracts with the goals of providing
"financial incentives for building new facilities and [establishing] a centralized
purchasing program over the entire output of avgas." Id. at 1023. The AGRP was a
program which allowed oil companies that entered into long-term avgas contracts
to seek reimbursement from the government for unanticipated expenses, such as
the costs associated with government mandated reallocation of avgas raw materials
between refineries. See id. The purpose of the AGRP was to compensate manufacturers for inefficiencies arising from the government's need for maximum overall
avgas production. See id.
43. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1049-50 (explaining government control of avgas
program).
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the manner in which avgas was blended to allow for greater overall
production, sometimes at the expense of an individual refiner's

production, but never directly owned or controlled the manufac44
ture of the separate avgas ingredients.
As the production of avgas increased, so too did the levels of
waste. 45 Some refiners used a portion of the alkylation acid waste in
other production capacities, resulting in another type of byproduct
known as "acid sludge" which was both difficult and costly to

reprocess. 46 Increased production of avgas, coupled with a
shortage of reprocessing facilities, led the refiners to contract for
47
the dumping of the accumulating acid sludge and alkylation acid.
B.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act

In 1980, Congress passed CERCLA as a response to public protest over several publicized instances of unsafe waste sites. 48 Although the CERCLA statute does not affirmatively state a purpose,
legislative history suggests that it was intended both to provide for
the cleanup of waste dumps and to serve as a vehicle for assigning
liability to those who caused the damage. 49 CERCLA gives effect to
this by naming four categories of responsible persons who can be
44. See id. at 1050 (describing Planned Blending Program). The Planned
Blending Program required refiners to exchange raw materials between them to
allow for greater overall production, sometimes resulting in additional cost and
diminished output for individual refiners. See id. These additional costs were recoverable through the AGRP. See Shell III, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1022-23.
45. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1051 (describing increased levels of hazardous
waste generated as result of greater avgas production).
46. See id. (describing byproducts of avgas production). Acid sludge has a
much lower acid content than alkylation acid and could not be reused in the refineries. See id.
47. See id. (describing motivation of refiners for dumping waste).
48. SeeJames R. MacAyeal, The ComprehensiveEnvironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: The Correct Paradigm of Strict Liability and the Problem of Individual Causation, 18 UCLAJ. ENVirL. L. & POL'v 217, 254-55 (2000/2001) (describing
public atmosphere preceding CERCLA). Among these publicized incidents were
Love Canal and Valley of the Drums. Id. CERCLA was signed into law by President
Carter on December 11, 1980. See id. at 257.
49. See Theurer, supra note 3, at 78 (providing summary of CERCLA legislative history). The legislative history of CERCLA is somewhat confusing because the
bill that passed as CERCLA was a combination of four prior legislative proposals.
See MacAyeal, supra note 48, at 256-57 (explaining background of CERCLA). To
deduce Congressional intent, courts have had to examine "the provisions in the
competing precursors to CERCLA" and review "what was included and excluded in
the final compromise." Id. at 258. Generally, the goals of CERCLA were the creation of a superfund to provide for the rehabilitation of waste sites and the imposition of liability upon "those responsible for the waste." See Theurer, supra note 3,
at 78 (discussing Congressional intent of CERCLA legislation).
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held strictly liable for the results of an actual or threatened release
of a hazardous substance into the environment. 5°1 Pursuant to section 107, CERCLA allows liability to be placed upon: owners or operators of a facility; anyone who operated or owned a facility at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance; anyone who arranges
for the disposal, treatment or transportation for purposes of disposal or treatment of hazardous waste; and anyone who accepts a haz5 1
ardous substance for transport..
A plaintiff must prove four elements to recover under CERCLA.5 2 First, the plaintiff must show that the site qualifies as a "facility" under CERCLA section 101 (9).53 Second, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that there was a "release" or "threatened release" of a
"hazardous substance."5 4 Third, the plaintiff must prove that the
government incurred costs as a result of the release. 55 Finally, the
plaintiff must show that the defendants qualify as one of the groups

50. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994) (prescribing parties who may be held liable
under CERCLA); see also MacAyeal, supra note 48, at 218 (discussing strict liability
under CERCLA).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). CERCLA allows the following to be held
liable for the costs of hazardous waste cleanup:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at
the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person,
by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance ....
Id.
52. See Nilsson, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining causation requirements for
CERCLA liability).
53. See Theurer, supra note 3, at 79 (stating elements for liability under CERCLA); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (B) (defining "facility" as "any site or area where
a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located . . .").
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (defining "release" as "any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching,
dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) . . .").
55. See Nilsson, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that liability for costs includes
both immediate and continuous remedial expenses incurred by federal or state
governments, or others if they are consistent with national contingency plan).
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specifically targeted for liability by section 107. 56 CERCLA provides
only limited affirmative defenses, specifically that the release was
caused by either an "act of God," an "act of war," or by an "act or
57
omission of a third party."
C.

Sovereign Immunity under CERCLA

Well-established law mandates that the United States is liable to
suit only to the degree to which it consents to be sued. 58 Moreover,
any waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal
59
and is not to be expanded by the judiciary.
Pursuant to section 120(a)(1) of CERCLA, "[e]ach department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government)
shall be subject to, and comply with, this Act in the same manner
and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any
nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 107 of
this Act." 60 In section 101, CERCLA also specifically includes the
United States in the definition of "person" who may be sued under
61
the statute.

56. See Andrea R. Prosics, Note, Johnson v. James Langley Operating Company:
Must Innocent Parties Foot the Bill Simply To Have a Little Peace of Mind?, 13 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 349, 356-61 (2002) (discussing requirements for proving link between
release of hazardous substances and incurring cleanup costs).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994) (prescribing affirmative defenses which
must be proven by preponderance of evidence); see also Theurer, supra note 3, at
79-80 (summarizing affirmative defenses as prescribed by CERCLA section 107).
Courts have interpreted these defenses very narrowly. Id.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (declaring
that "[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to
be sued . . ."); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (holding that
United States may only be sued to extent provided for by Congress).
59. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (holding that
waivers of government's sovereign immunity must be expressed unequivocally).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (1) (declaring application of CERCLA to federal government); see also Theurer, supra note 3, at 82 (detailing "competing concepts" of
CERCLA immunity waiver). Courts have had difficulty applying the CERCLA
waiver in cases where the government acts as a regulator, not as a person. See id.
Courts have upheld government immunity in circumstances when the government
is regulating the cleanup of a site, but have found waiver of immunity when the
government is involved in more than just the cleanup. See id.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21) (including "United States Government" in definition of "person"). CERCLA defines person as "an individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United
States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a
State, or any interstate body." Id.
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The Supreme Court addressed federal immunity under CER62
CLA, for the first and only time, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.
Although the cause of action in Union Gas was against a state, the
Court addressed federal immunity, stating in dicta that section
120(a) (1) of CERCLA was an "unequivocal expression of the Federal Government's waiver of its own sovereign immunity."63 While
parts of the Union Gas opinion relating to states' immunity have
been overturned, courts continue to abide by the finding of a fed64
eral immunity waiver.
Prior to the Ninth Circuit in Shell Oil, only a few federal appellate circuit courts issued opinions on the CERCLA sovereign immunity waiver. 65 In FMC Corporation v. United States Department of
Commerce,66 the Third Circuit ruled that CERCLA section 120(a) (1)
unequivocally waived federal immunity, holding that "when the
government engages in activities that would make a private party
liable if the private party engaged in those types of activities, then
the government is also liable." 67 In East Bay Municipal Utility District
v. United States Department of Commerce,68 the District of Columbia
Circuit likewise found CERCLA to waive immunity, declaring that
"the waiver of immunity contained in [section 120(a) (1)] is coex62. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 1 (1989) (finding Section 120(a) (1) of CERCLA
to be waiver of United States sovereign immunity).
63. Id. at 10 (comparing language of CERCLA section 120(a) (1) with section
101 (20) (D) to find intent to waive sovereign immunity of individual states). The
issue in Union Gas was whether Pennsylvania could be held liable as an operator
under CERCLA for the state's participation in causing a tar leak on property
owned by the plaintiff. See id. at 5-6. The Supreme Court found that the states
could be liable under CERCLA. See id. at 13.
64. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), as overturning Union Gas finding that states are liable
under CERCLA). The waiver of sovereign immunity as applied to the United
States pursuant to CERCLA Section 120(a) (1) has been consistently upheld. See,
e.g., East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 330 U.S. App.
D.C. 31 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding waiver of immunity contained in section
9620(a)(1) to be coextensive with scope of CERCLA liability standards); United
States v. Allied Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20061 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 1990) (finding United States Navy liable under CERCLA for environmental contamination of
neighboring property); Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224
(W.D. Mich. 1993) (finding 42 U.S.C. section 9620(a) to waive sovereign immunity
for federal facilities); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia v. Peck Iron &
Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1281, 1285 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that "CERCLA plainly
intends to hold the government liable to the same extent as nongovernmental
entities...").
65. See FMC, 29 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994) (providing background of judicial inquiry into CERCLA sovereign immunity waiver).
66. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
67. Id. at 840 (explaining CERCLA waiver of sovereign immunity).
68. 142 F.3d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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tensive with the scope of the substantive liability standards of
69
CERCLA.
D.

Federal Arranger Liability under CERCLA

Arrangers are one of the four classes of persons for whom CERCLA assigns liability. 70 Although CERCLA attempts to distinguish
each class individually, courts have found elements of control and
ownership to apply to a few of the classes, resulting in a somewhat
71
confusing analysis.
Several cases have dealt with the issue of arranger liability. In
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(AEPACCO),72 the Eighth Circuit attempted to clarify the application of CERCLA as well as the requirements for being an arranger. 73 NEPACCO centered on the issue of liability against

officers of a corporation to recover the costs of cleaning up a site
used by the corporation to dump drums of chemical waste.74 The

Eighth Circuit first held that Congress intended CERCLA to be applied retroactively, thus making it a viable tool to recover for acts
committed prior to 1980.75 The court further held the corporate
officers liable as arrangers, stating that "[i] t is the authority to control the handling and disposal of hazardous substances that is criti'76
cal under the statutory scheme.
In United States v. Aceto, 77 the Eighth Circuit revisited arranger
liability. 78 The issue in Aceto was whether pesticide manufacturers
69. Id. at 481 (finding CERCLA waiver of sovereign immunity).
70. For a discussion of parties identified for potential liability under CERCLA,
see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
71. See Nilsson, supra note 5,at 36 (explaining that courts have given CERCLA
broad interpretation and that ownership is relevant to liability for both "owners"
and "arrangers").
72. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
73. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810
F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter NIEPACCO] (providing method for CERCLA analysis).
74. See id., 810 F.2d at 729-31 (explaining facts of case). The relevant Defendants in the case included the supervisor of the manufacturing plant and the president of the corporation that owned the plant. See id. at 729.
75. See id. at 732-37 (discussing Congressional intent to apply CERCLA retroactively). The court found support for a retroactive application of CERCLA in the
statute's legislative history. See id. at 733 (citing H.R. 1016, 96th Cong. (1980)).
76. Id. at 743 (stating finding of individual liability). The court held that arranger liability does not require "proof of personal ownership or actual physical
possession of hazardous substances," but rather turns on the degree of control the
defendants possessed over the material. See id.
77. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
78. See id. at 1375 (revisiting liabilities under CERCLA).
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could be held liable for the costs of cleaning up a contaminated site
that was once operated by a now bankrupt corporation who used
the site to mix and process chemicals for the manufacturers. 79 The
court found the manufacturers liable, declaring that it was their
ownership of the processed chemicals that raised them to the level
of arranger. 8°)
More recently, both the Third and Eighth Circuits have provided insight into the issue of United States liability under CERCLA. In FMC, the Third Circuit considered a suit against the
United States seeking costs associated with cleaning up hazardous
waste deposited at a site used to produce high tenacity rayon during
World War I1.81 The plaintiffs established that the United States
was heavily involved with this plant during the war, evidenced by
three facts: first, that the government installed and leased to the
plant owner government owned machinery; second, that the government built and owned an adjacent acid plant next to the facility
to provide the rayon manufacturers with materials; finally, that the
82
government directly controlled the rayon manufacturing process.
After initially finding that the United States waived sovereign immunity pursuant to section 120(a) (1) of CERCLA, the court found the
United States liable as an "operator."8 3 Although the district court
had previously found the government also liable as an arranger, the
circuit court was evenly split on the issue and declined from issuing
84
an opinion on the matter.
The Eighth Circuit provided a more definitive opinion when it
addressed federal arranger liability in United States v. Vertac Chemical
79. See United States v. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375-76 (describing facts of case).

The Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA] sought to recover costs
incurred in cleaning up a facility owned by the bankrupt Aidex Corporation. See
id. at 1375. Aidex was a pesticide formulator who mixed pesticide ingredients for
pesticide manufacturers according to the specifications of the manufacturers. See
id. This action was aimed at the manufacturers, whom the EPA claimed were arrangers for purpose of CERCLA liability. See id.
80. See id. at 1381 (noting that some courts have imposed CERCLA liability
where defendants sought to characterize their disposal arrangement as "sale").
81. See FMC, 29 F.3d 833, 835 (3rd Cir. 1994). The plant at issue was not
originally used to manufacture rayon, but was converted to such at the behest of
the Federal Government following the attack at Pearl Harbor. Id. Due to a rubber
shortage, the government placed a high priority on the production of high tenacity rayon for use as a supplement in the manufacture of tires. Id.
82. See id. at 837-38 (describing federal oversight of rayon production).
83. See id. at 842, 845 (analyzing government role in manufacturing process).
84. See id. at 845-46 (declining to issue opinion). By not issuing an opinion,
the court affirmed the district court holding that the United States was liable as an
arranger. Id. at 846.
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8 5 Vertac
Corporation.
involved the cleanup of waste generated by the
manufacture of Agent Orange during the Vietnam War.8 6 The
United States purchased the chemical from independent manufacturers under rated contracts which mandated strict product specifications.8 7 The government facilitated the purchase of ingredients
and performed inspections of the production facility; however, the
government never owned any of the raw materials used in manufacture."" Although the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the government should have been aware that the. production of Agent Orange
would result in toxic waste, the government never knew how the
manufacturer was disposing of the waste.8 9 The court declined to
find that the United States was an arranger. 90 Under the court's
CERCLA analysis, the government could not be an arranger because it never owned or possessed the hazardous materials and that
the government's regulatory authority over the manufacturing process was not enough to prove possession.9 1

IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In reviewing the Shell Oil decision of the district court, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had two issues to resolve. First,
whether the United States waived its sovereign immunity for purposes of liability under CERCLA. 92 Second, assuming the United
States waived immunity, whether its participation in the McColl
85. See United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 1995)
(dismissing claim of federal arranger liability).
86. See id. at 806 (describing basis for CERCLA claim). Agent Orange, a mixture of 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid, was
an herbicide used by the United States military as a defoliant in Vietnam. Id.
87. See id. (reciting facts of case). When a contract is "rated", it is given priority over other contracts, on the theory, "that it is deemed necessary or appropriate
to promote national defense." Id.
88. See id. at 807 (noting that United States did not hold any financial ownership interest in land, buildings, tools, machinery or equipment during production
of Agent Orange).
89. See id. (showing that rated contracts between Hercules and United States
did not address manner in which Hercules was to handle waste generated by production of Agent Orange).
90. See Vertac, 46 F.3d at 811 (concluding that United States actual involvement in operations of Jacksonville facility was sporadic and minimal).
91. See id. (noting that United States neither actively nor constructively supplied Hercules with raw materials). The court differentiated Vertac from NEPACCO
in that the NEPACCO defendants had immediate supervisory and direct responsibility for the manufacturing process whereas the role of the government in Vertac
was merely regulatory. See id. at 810.
92. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Shell Oil of sovereign
immunity pursuant to CERCLA, see infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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waste raised them to the level of an arranger, and therefore, subject
93
to liability under CERCLA.
A.

Sovereign Immunity

The Ninth Circuit explained that to find a relinquishment of
immunity, there must be an "unequivocal expression of intent" to
give up immunity; this waiver must be "unambiguous" and "strictly
construed in favor of the sovereign.

'94

The United States argued

that the section 120(a) (1) waiver was limited to instances in which
the government carried out "nongovernmental" activities, evidenced both by the fact that section 120 was listed under the heading "Federal Facilities" and by the theory that "the phrase making
the government subject to [liability under] CERCLA 'in the same
manner and to the same extent... as any nongovernmental entity'
restricts the waiver of sovereign immunity to situations in which the
government acts as a 'nongovernmental entity.' "' 5 The Court of
Appeals disagreed and instead followed the Third Circuit's FMC
opinion, rejecting the idea that the heading "Federal Facilities" was
determinative of a desire to limit federal liability.9 6 In upholding

the district court finding of a sovereign immunity waiver, the Court
of Appeals referred to Union Gas to hold that CERCLA section
120(a) (1) serves as an unequivocal waiver of the Federal Government's immunity from suit.9 7 The court further found that the
United States had previously been held liable under CERCLA for
93. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of federal arranger liability
in Shell Oil, see infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
94. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Lane v. Pena, 518
U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). Lane held that those "suing the United States must point to

an 'unequivocal expression' of intent to waive sovereign immunity." Id.
95. See id. at 1052 (stating government's argument against CERCLA immunity
waiver).
96. See id. at 1052-53 (providing basis for upholding federal waiver of sover-

eign immunity). The Ninth Circuit pointed out an inherent flaw in the government's argument by showing that the heading "Federal Facilities," upon which the
government based its argument, was not incorporated into CERCLA until 1986, six

years after the section 9620 waiver was passed. See id. The Ninth Circuit held that
the heading "Federal Facilities" was adopted merely for organizational purposes
and was not intended to modify the section 9620 immunity waiver. See id.
97. See id. at 1052 (citing Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). The Ninth Circuit
additionally referred to East Bay, 142 F.3d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1998), holding that

CERCLA section 9628 "does not, on its face, 'suggest a distinction between the
exercise of private ... and regulatory powers' and FMC, 29 F.3d 833, 841-42 (3rd
Cir. 1994) which held that "the relevant sovereign immunity question under CERCLA is ... whether [the government's] activities, however characterized, are sufficient to impose liability on the government as an owner, operator, or arranger."
Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1053.
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"governmental" acts and that fear of a floodgate of litigation was

exaggerated.98
B.

Arranger Liability

Although the Oil Companies only argued for a broad interpretation of arranger liability, the district court found the United
States liable under both a "direct arranger" theory as well as under
the broader theory advocated by the refiners. 99 Under the direct
theory, an arranger must have "direct involvement in the arrangements for the disposal of waste" to be held liable.'(' The district
court believed that governmental intervention in facilitating the
lease of a storage tank, coupled with the evidence of a letter from
the PAW in which the agency declared acid sludge disposal to be a
problem of the WPB, was enough to show direct involvement. 0 1
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and found these facts
"insufficient" to prove direct governmental participation in the disposal of acid waste at McColl.

1 °2

The Ninth Circuit likewise declined to find liability under the
broad arranger theory. 10 3 While the district court relied upon the
Eighth Circuit's Aceto opinion and the Oil Companies urged that
NEPACCO provided additional support for arranger liability, the
Ninth Circuit dismissed the relevance of these decisions. 10 4 The
98. See e.g., Allied Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20061 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1995)
(finding United States Navy liable under CERCLA for authorizing demolition causing release of hazardous substances).
99. See Shell II, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19778, at *19-20 (applying arranger
theories).
100. Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1055 (citing Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v.
United States, 41 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 1994) as example of case involving traditional
direct arranger liability). The Ninth Circuit in Cadillac Fairview held rubber companies liable as arrangers for transferring contaminated styrene to Dow Chemical
for purposes of reprocessing. See CadillacFairview, 41 F.3d at 566.
101. See Shell I, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19778, at *24-25 (holding that "once an
entity undertakes to arrange for disposal or treatment, it cannot abdicate responsibility when the disposal becomes infeasible.").
102. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1055 (overruling district court opinion).
103. See id. at 1059 (stating holding of case). The "broad" theory of arranger
liability was espoused by the district court in Shell 1. See Shell I, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19778, at *20. This broad theory, based upon Aceto, holds that "a party is
liable as an arranger (1) if it supplies raw materials to be used in making a finished
product, (2) and it retains ownership or control of the work in process, (3) where
the generation of hazardous substances is inherent in the production process." Id.
104. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1055-58 (failing to see relevance of Aceto or
NEPACCO). The Oil Companies argued that, under NEPACCO, neither ownership
nor control were required for arranger liability; that the authority to control was
enough. See id. at 1057 (discussing Oil Company's argument under NEPACCO); see
also NEPACCO,810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (stressing importance of control).
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Ninth Circuit instead applied FMC and Vertac.'0 5 Under the FMC
analysis, the Ninth Circuit compared the facts of Shell Oil to those of
FMC.'0 6 The Ninth Circuit found the level of government control
in FMC to be greater than that in Shell Oil and therefore more conducive to a finding of an arranger relationship. 0 7 The Ninth Circuit concluded that because the Third Circuit in FMCwas unwilling
to find an arranger relationship, even with the high level of government control, it would be unreasonable for the court to now find
an arranger relationship when control was more attenuated. 08
The Ninth Circuit then compared the Shell Oil facts to those of the
Vertac case. 109 In Vertac, the Eighth Circuit declined to hold the
United States liable as an arranger under a relationship very similar
to that of the government in Shell Oil.110 The Ninth Circuit found
this decision persuasive and held that actual control requires the
obligation to control waste disposal, not merely the authority to
control.

II
V.

CRITICAl., ANALYSIS

A. Sovereign Immunity
Considering the unequivocal expression of waiver contained in
the statute, the primary weakness of the government's argument
against waiver, and the clarity of prior case law, it was virtually certain that the Ninth Circuit would uphold the District Court's find105. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1058 (finding FMC and Vertac decisions to be
more applicable).
106. See id. (stating that FMC court declined to find United States liable as
"arranger" even though government owned machinery used in plant owner's
factory).
107. See id. at 1058-59 (comparing facts of Shell Oil to facts of FMC). For a
discussion of the facts and holding of FMC, see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
108. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1059 (declining to find United States liable as
arranger).
109. See id. (comparing facts of Shell Oil to facts of Vertac). For a discussion of
the facts and holding of Vertac, see supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
110. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1058-59 (comparing Shell Oil circumstances with
those of Vertac). The Shell Oil court stressed that in both Vertac and Shell Oil:
products were manufactured for purchase by the United States in wartime,... the manufacturing was carried out under government contracts

and pursuant to government programs that gave it priority over other
manufacturing.... [and that] the United States was aware that waste was
being produced, but did not direct the manner in which the companies
disposed of it.
Id. at 1059.
111. See id. (stating that although level of government control in Shell Oil was
greater than in Vertac, "this was a matter of degree rather than kind.").

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

17

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4

294

VILIANOvA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XIV: p. 277

ing of a waiver of immunity under CERCLA. 112 The Ninth Circuit
justifiably found CERCLA section 120(a) (1) to be an obvious surrender of federal immunity to the extent that section 107 would
impose liability upon a private party. 113 Section 120(a) (1) provides
that "[e] ach department, agency and instrumentality of the United
States ...shall be subject to, and comply with this chapter in the
same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under
section [107] of this title."'1 14 In addition to section 9620, Congress
further provided for federal liability under section 101(21) by including the United States in the class of "persons" who may be sued
under CERCLA. 1 5 Thus, after recognizing two separate and delib1 6
erate statutory expressions, the court wisely upheld the waiver.
The tenuous arguments made by the United States serve to
provide greater support for a finding of waiver. 11 7 Although the
United States correctly pointed out that the section 120 waiver falls
within the "Federal Facilities" heading, the government's hypothesis that Congress only intended to waive immunity in respect to federally owned facilities is flawed.' 18 The Ninth Circuit explained
that when CERCLA was first adopted in 1980, there was no "Federal
Facilities" heading above section 120; the heading was incorporated
in 1986 for purposes of organization and there was never any intent
to change the original scope of the waiver.' 1 9
Additionally, prior case law overwhelmingly supports the
court's holding. 120 The Supreme Court's matter-of-fact statement
in Union Gas that the federal government unquestionably waived
sovereign immunity under CERCLA suggests that this issue is set112. See Government's Liability is not Limited to 'Nongovernmental'Activities, Real
Estate/Environmental Liability News, Mar. 1, 2002 [hereinafter Government's Liability] (suggesting possible implication from Shell Oil decision).
113. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1053 (stating "[if CERCLA § 107] provides for

liability, then [§ 120(a) (1)] waives sovereign immunity to that liability.").
114. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1)(1994).

115. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)(1994) (defining who may be found liable under
CERCLA).
116. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1053 (stating that there was no language in
waiver of immunity provision that "would have limited the scope of the waiver.").
117. See id. at 1052-53 (presenting United States arguments against CERCLA
sovereign immunity waiver).
118. See id. at 1052-53 (discussing gradual changes to CERCLA statute).
119. See id. (clarifying that "Federal Facilities" heading was added for organi-

zational benefit only).
120. See id. at 1053 (mentioning that only two circuits have ruled on question
of sovereign immunity under CERCLA, with both holding that sovereign immunity
was waived).
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tied and unworthy of significant debate. 12 1 This interpretation is
further buttressed by the Third Circuit's similar opinion in FMC
and the District of Columbia's opinion in East Bay.' 22 By adhering
to prior case law, the Ninth Circuit preserves a sense of predictabil1 23
ity and judicial order for future litigants.
B.

Arranger Liability
1. Application of case law

While the district court relied primarily upon Aceto and
NEPACCO to find the United States liable, the Ninth Circuit emphasized FMC and Vertac to overturn the government's liability. 124 The
Ninth Circuit dismissed the importance of Aceto by focusing on the
level of control of the polluting chemicals. 125 According to the
court's theory, Aceto is inapplicable because the government was not
an owner of the chemicals. 1 26 While the court is correct that the
government never owned the chemicals, the logic in basing its
opinion upon this distinction is elusive. 127 CERCLA, in defining
arranger accountability, establishes that both those who own or possess hazardous substances may be liable. 12 8 Instead of dismissing
Aceto's relevance because the government did not own the chemicals, the Ninth Circuit should have examined the levels of control
demonstrated by the government.

29

121. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (stating that CERCLA sovereign immunity waiver applies to federal government).
122. For a discussion of FMC and East Bay in the context of sovereign immunity, see supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
123. See Government's Liability, supra note 112 (stating that Shell Oil court adhered to prior opinions of other circuits).
124. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1054-59 (focusing on FMC and Vertac rather than
Aceto and NEPACCO).

125. See id. at 1056 (finding Aceto unpersuasive). Whereas the defendants in
Aceto actually owned the chemicals, the government in Shell Oil merely assisted the
manufacturer in procuring chemicals and expressed regulatory control over the
production process; the government never owned the chemicals and was only an
"end purchaser of avgas." See id.
126. See id. (dismissing relevance of Aceto).
127. See Shell II, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19778, at *22-25 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18,
1995) (analyzing "ownership" standards under Aceto).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994) (listing those eligible for CERCLA
liability).
129. See e.g., Shell II, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19778, at *22 (finding government
regulation of avgas components so severe as to amount to government being akin
to supplier). The court stated:
[w]hen the Government, as a practical matter orders a private company
to supply a finished product, dictates the delivery dates, the quantity to be
shipped, the prices of the materials, the specifications of the raw materi-
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The Ninth Circuit was likewise unpersuaded by the NEPACCO
holding.'3 0 The court rejected the Oil Companies' argument that
NEPACCO stood for the idea that neither ownership nor actual control are determinative for a finding of arranger liability and that
mere authority to control was sufficient.' 31 The Ninth Circuit instead held that actual control was requisite and, failing to find any
actual control by the government in Shell Oil, refrained from imposing liability.' 13 2 The level of government control in avgas production was extreme: the government was actively involved in
overseeing the blending of avgas, it assisted in the acquisition of the
chemicals, it strictly monitored the inventory levels at the refineries,
it forced refineries to maximize all existing capacity towards avgas
production, it assisted in the financing of new avgas production facilities, it facilitated the lease of storage tanks, and evidence suggests that the government was at least latently aware of the dumping
at the McColl site. 3 3 Although none of these acts may individually
raise the government's involvement to the level of actual control,
taken in the aggregate, actual control seems apparent. 34 By focusing on the trees of individual facts, the Ninth Circuit failed to see
35
the forest of governmental control present in Shell Oil.'

136
The Ninth Circuit partially based its opinion upon FMC.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, because the Third Circuit in FMC
was unable to reach a majority opinion on whether or not the
United States was liable as an arranger and because the facts of FMC
seemed to suggest a greater level of governmental control than was

als, and provides the transportation for the raw materials, there can be no
question but that it is 'supplying' the raw materials ....

Id.
130. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d 1057-58 (rejecting Oil Company's NEPACCO
argument).
131. See NEPACCO, 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding corporate officer liable under CERCLA as arranger because he possessed authority to control
handling and disposal of hazardous substances).
132. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1057 (stressing importance of actual control).
The Ninth Circuit held actual control is requisite to finding liability. See id.
133. See Shell If, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19778, at *23-24 (recounting numerous
ways government expressed control over avgas production).
134. See id. at *23 (finding government control to be persuasive). The district

court stated "the question is 'whether the fact-finder could infer from all the circumstances 'that a transaction in fact involves an arrangement for the disposal or
treatment of a hazardous substance.'" See id. at *21 (quoting CadillacFairview, 41
F.3d 562, 562 (9th Cir. 1994)).
135. See id. at *25 (holding government liable as arranger).
136. See generally FMC, 29 F.3d 833 (3rd Cir. 1994) (holding government liable

as arranger).
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present in Shell Oil, they should not find arranger liability.1 3 7 Regrettably, the Ninth Circuit failed to disclose that the district court
in FMC had found enough evidence for arranger liability and that,
because the circuit court could not agree on a reason to overrule
the district court and instead refrained from issuing an opinion on
arranger liability, the circuit court allowed the district court finding
of arranger liability to stand.1 3 8 Moreover, because the Third Circuit found the government liable under an operator theory, the
need to find them additionally liable as arrangers was not pressing. 13 9 Reliance upon FMC to find governmental non-liability appears unsound.

40

The Ninth Circuit also relied upon the Eighth Circuit's Vertac
decision. 14 1 In Vertac, the United States was exonerated from liability as an arranger because the government neither owned the
chemicals used in the manufacturing process nor expressed actual
control in the production. 142 While the rationale applied in Vertac
is very similar to the rationale employed by the Ninth Circuit in
Shell Oil, the facts of Vertac are sufficiently different to make the
Ninth Circuit's reliance upon Vertac misguided.1 43 The level of control employed by the United States in regard to Agent Orange production pales in comparison to the near totality expressed over
144
avgas during World War II.
The Ninth Circuit stressed that con-

trol was the key element in Shell Oil, therefore the question remains
as to why the Ninth Circuit would rely so heavily upon Vertac when
1 45
the level of control between the two cases was in such contrast.
137. See Shell Oil 294 F.3d at 1058-59 (utilizing FMC to refrain from finding
federal arranger liability). The Ninth Circuit stated "[i]f it was a close question on
the facts of FMC whether the United States was an arranger, it cannot possibly be a
close question on the facts in the case before us." Id. at 1058.
138. See FMC, 29 F.3d at 846 (stating that "[tihe court is equally divided on
this point and consequently we will affirm the judgment of the district court holding the government liable as an arranger without discussion.").
139. See id. at 844 (finding United States liable as operator under CERCLA).
140. See id. (basing finding of United States liability as operator on "substan-

tial control" government exercised over corporation).
141. See generally Vertac, 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995) (dismissing claim of arranger liability against United States in connection with oversight of Agent Orange

production).
142. See id. at 810-12 (analyzing arranger argument).
143. The Eighth Circuit in Vertac suggested in dicta that government coercion or intervention may be enough to meet the level of control necessary for an
arranger. See Vertac, 46 F.3d at 811.
144. See Nilsson, supra note 5, at 36 (stating that there is no bright line rule

under CERCLA for when entities achieve status of arranger; courts have found
broad application to be necessary to meet Congressional intent).
145. See Vertac, 46 F.3d at 806 (providing details of Agent Orange production
contracts). In contrast to the urgent demand for avgas which necessitated a gov-
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2. Failure to give proper deference to the apparent motivation of
Congress
Although Congress never incorporated a statement of intent
into CERCLA, legislative history shows that CERCLA was intended
as a means of placing the cost of hazardous waste cleanup on those
responsible for the waste being released. 146 Shell Oil runs counter
to this intention. 47 As stated by the FMC court, placing "a cost of
the war on the United States, and thus on society as a whole,... is
neither untoward nor inconsistent with the policy underlying CERCLA.' 148 The district court echoed this sentiment when it stated,
"[I]t stands to reason thatjust as the American people stood to benefit from the successful prosecution of the war effort, so too must

the American public bear the burden of a cost directly and inescap1 49
ably created by the war effort, the production of avgas waste."
VI.

IMPACT

In 1996 it was estimated that the cost of cleaning up defense
contract sites will be near four hundred billion dollars. 150 As this
15 1
liability continues to be realized, litigation is certain to follow.
How Shell Oil will be interpreted in these future actions remains to
be seen, but certain impacts seem likely. Primarily, Shell Oil will
stand for the proposition that the United States has waived soverernmental order requiring all avgas producers to maximize production, Agent Orange was only obtained from select manufacturers through a competitive bidding
process. See id.
146. See Nilsson, supra note 5, at 29 (explaining that CERCLA's main concern
is remediation of contaminationed sites, not levying of penalties).
147. See generally, Evan Halper, Oil Firms Lose Cleanup Appeal, Los Angeles
Times, California Metro; Part 2; Page 3, June 29, 2002 (stating that residential
neighbors of McColl site have taken sides with oil companies). The current McColl residents believe that the oil companies "were key in cleaning the property
and that the government should take responsibility for the pressure it put on companies to produce during the war." Id.
148. See FMC, 29 F.3d 833, 846 (3rd Cir. 1994) (explaining that responsibility
for amending broadly applicable statutes rests with Congress, not judiciary).
149. Shell III, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1027 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (explaining appropriateness of holding government liable for avgas waste under CERCLA). The district court reiterated its point, saying that "[i]n looking at the CERCLA statute, it
appears to the court that Congress must thereby have had in mind unusual cases
such as this." Id. at 1030.
150. See Theurer, supra note 3, at 67 (estimating nationwide cost for cleaning
up federal defense contract sites).
151. See Major Randall James Bunn, ContractorRecovery for Current Environmental Cleanup Costs Under World War Il-Era Government Contract Indemnification Clauses,
41 A.F. L. REv. 163, 163 (1997) (explaining that potentially responsible parties will
be spurred towards litigation due to excessive costs associated with CERCLA
cleanup).
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eign immunity to the extent of CERC[A section 107.152 With the

Third Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit and now the Ninth
Circuit all finding a federal waiver under CERCILA, this issue seems
15 3
nearly settled.
Although suing the government will be easier, winning a suit
will not. 154 Shell Oil will be interpreted as requiring actual control
for arranger liability under CERCLA.' 55 To be liable as an arranger, Shell Oil will require a party to have owned, possessed or
have both the authority and the obligation to dispose of hazardous
materials.' 5 6 Because of these strict requirements, Shell Oil will
make it more difficult for private parties to shift the liability for
15 7
cleanup costs to the government.
However unlikely, there remains a possibility of legislative intervention.' 58 Because the Ninth Circuit has restricted governmental arranger liability to instances of actual control, CERCIA has
been limited in a manner not necessarily envisioned by Con-

152. For a discussion of the CERCLA section 107 waiver of sovereign immunity, see supra notes 58-69 and 94-98 as well as accompanying text.
153. See generally FMC, 29 F.3d 833 (finding CERCLA to contain waiver of sovereign immunity); East Bay, 142 F.3d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that CERCLA
immunity waiver is coextensive with scope of CERCLA liability). The Eighth Circuit also implied that CERCLA contains a waiver of sovereign immunity by analyzing governmental involvement in a manner similar to that of a private operator.
See Vertac, 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995) (examining federal government for liability
under CERCLA).
154. See Clare Bienvenu, Note, United States v. Shell Oil Co.: The Tension of CERCLA ArrangerLiability for Government Wartime ProductionFacilities,16 TUL. ENVrL. L.J.
199, 210-11 (2002) (stressing difficulty of proving that government regulatory actions raise government into level of owner, operator, arranger or transporter).
155. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1057-58 (stating requirements for arranger
liability).
156. See Locke Liddell & Sapp LLP, Ninth Circuit Limits of Arranger Liability
Under CERCLA, Texas Environmental Compliance Update, Volume 11, Issue 3
(May 2002) (explaining that value of Shell Oil decision is found in its explanation
of requirements for arranger liability).
157. See Bienvenu, supra note 154, at 211-12 (suggesting that Ninth Circuit
could have provided better roadmap for future litigants by conducting NEPACCO
"authority to control analysis" and Aceto control analysis).
158. See Frank B. Cross and Blake J. Nelson, Strategic InstitutionalEffects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking,95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1437, 1455 (citing Civil Rights Act of
1991 as example of Congress overriding judicial interpretations of Civil Rights Act
of 1964); see also Note, Executive Discretion and the CongressionalDefense of Statutes, 92
YALE L.J. 970, 989 (1983) (explaining Congressional concern in maintaining
legislation).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

23

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4

300

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XIV: p. 277

gress. 15 9 Should Congress deem the judicial interpretation to be
flawed, CERCLA may be changed to clarify Congressional intent.] 6()
Walter Greiner
159. See Nilsson, supra note 5, at 29 (explaining that Congressional intent focused on cleaning up polluted sites regardless of liability and penalty assessment).
160. See Cross and Nelson, supra note 158, at 1458 (describing that legislative
overrides occur when judiciary "is ideologically outside the congressional policy
preference.").
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